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Abstract
We have shown recently that damage to the right hemisphere impairs the ability to update mental models when evidence 
suggests an old model is no longer appropriate. We argue that this deficit is generic in the sense that it crosses multiple cog-
nitive and perceptual domains. Here, we examined the nature of this updating impairment to determine more precisely the 
underlying mechanisms. We had right (RBD, N = 12) and left brain damaged (LBD, N = 10) patients perform versions of our 
picture-morphing task in which pictures gradually morph from one object (e.g., shark) to another (e.g., plane). Performance 
was contrasted against two groups of healthy older controls, one matched on age (HCO-age-matched, N = 9) and another 
matched on general level of cognitive ability (HCO-cognitively-matched, N = 9). We replicated our earlier findings showing 
that RBD patients took longer than LBD patients and HCOs to report seeing the second object in a sequence of morphing 
images. The groups did not differ when exposed to a morphing sequence a second time, or when responding to ambiguous 
images outside the morphing context. This indicates that RBD patients have little difficulty alternating between known 
representations or labeling ambiguous images. Instead, the difficulty lies in generating alternate hypotheses for ambiguous 
information. Lesion overlay analyses, although speculative given the sample size, are consistent with our fMRI work in 
healthy individuals in implicating the anterior insular cortex as critical for updating mental models.
Keywords Right brain damage · Mental representations · Updating failures · Picture morphing · Exploration
Introduction
Damage to the right hemisphere results in a range of het-
erogeneous impairments, including impoverished spatial 
attention (i.e., neglect; Danckert et al. 2012a), statistical 
learning (Shaqiri and Anderson 2013; Shaqiri et al. 2013), 
humor appreciation (Brownell et al. 1983), working memory 
capacity (Ferber and Danckert 2006; Husain et al. 2001), and 
deficient Theory of Mind (Happé et al. 1999; Griffin et al. 
2006; Weed et al. 2010). We have argued that these impair-
ments can be parsimoniously explained by a general impair-
ment in updating mental models (Danckert et al. 2012a, b; 
Filipowicz et al. 2016; Geng and Vossel 2013; Shaqiri and 
Anderson 2013; Shaqiri et al. 2013; Stöttinger et al. 2014; 
Vocat et al. 2012).
Everyday we are confronted with an enormous amount 
of information. Mental models allow us to deal with this 
complexity by compactly representing the regularities that 
govern our environment. We use these models to guide our 
decisions (e.g., Is the situation dangerous? Is this food edi-
ble? Johnson-Laird 2004; Griffiths and Tenenbaum 2012; 
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Tenenbaum et al. 2011). Since the world is in flux, these 
models are only useful if we update them when things 
change. While a salient shift in the environment allows us 
to simply react (e.g., a bolt of lightning indicates that it is 
time to head indoors), gradual changes in the environment 
require the aggregation of mismatching evidence to provoke 
a proactive decision (e.g., when does cloud cover become 
sufficiently menacing to indicate a coming storm? McGuire 
et al. 2014).
We previously showed that right brain damage resulted 
in selective impairment of gradual updating in response to 
small, subtle environmental changes. We had left (LBD) 
and right brain damaged (RBD) patients play the children’s 
game of ‘rock, paper, scissors’ (RPS) against a computer 
opponent. The computer initially played randomly before 
switching to ‘paper’ 80% of the time. While LBD patients 
and controls rapidly adopted the optimal strategy (i.e., scis-
sors), RBD patients failed to respond to the transition, with 
most patients continuing to play randomly (Danckert et al. 
2012b). Similarly, RBD patients showed a severe updating 
impairment in a gradually morphing picture task, in which 
one object (e.g., shark) morphed over several iterations into 
a completely different object (e.g., plane; Fig. 2, top panel). 
The logic was to first provide participants with a mental 
model (e.g., “It’s a shark”) and then evaluate how much 
evidence was required for them to update to a new mental 
model (e.g., “It’s a plane now”). RBD patients needed sig-
nificantly more evidence (i.e., more pictures) before they 
reported seeing the second object compared to LBD patients 
and healthy controls. Performance in the RPS task correlated 
with performance in the picture morphing task, indicating 
a general updating impairment across multiple cognitive 
domains (Stöttinger et al. 2014).
While our prior studies showed an updating impair-
ment after RBD, they did not unequivocally demonstrate 
the mechanism for this impairment. Updating to gradually 
evolving stimuli requires several different processes: (1) we 
need to be able to detect and accumulate evidence of a mis-
match. (2) When the mismatch reaches some threshold we 
need to explore for potential alternative interpretations. (3) 
Finally, we need to proactively switch to this new interpre-
tation. The aim of the research reported here was to test for 
the integrity of each of these mechanisms in RBD patients.
From our prior study, we know that RBD patients notice 
small changes in the sequences of morphing images. RBD 
patients, however, incorporated changes into their initial per-
ceptual representation (e.g., “The shark’s fins are getting 
bigger.”), rather than entertaining an entirely novel interpre-
tation (e.g., fins have now become wings). Similarly, within 
the context of the rock, paper, scissors game, although RBD 
patients fail to update to a change in strategy, their own play 
choices do reflect the fact that they have noticed something 
has changed. That is, RBD patients rapidly abandon their old 
play strategy but fail to adopt a new strategy optimized for 
the change in their opponent’s bias (Stöttinger et al. 2014). 
In combination, these data suggest that the impairment in 
updating following RBD may be due to either (1) a failure 
to explore alternative interpretations in light of observed 
changes or (2) a general inability to proactively switch.
To evaluate these hypotheses, RBD and LBD patients as 
well as healthy seniors (HCO) were presented with three 
versions of our picture morphing task. The hypotheses and 
predictions for this study are summarized in Table 1. In the 
gradual condition participants saw four picture sets in which 
one object (e.g., shark) morphed into a different object 
(e.g., plane; replication of Stöttinger et al. 2014; Fig. 2, 
top row). In the repeat condition, some of these sequences 
were repeated in the reverse order (e.g., plane-to-shark). In 
the random condition, images of four additional morphing 
sequences were presented in random order with all pictures 
intermixed. For example, a participant would see the sec-
ond picture of the gun-hair dryer picture set, followed by 
the ninth picture of the spider-sun picture set, and so on 
(Fig. 2, middle row). We compared the likelihood that par-
ticipants reported the first or second object for pictures based 
on their order in the morphing sequence (i.e., 1st to 15th 
picture position), and on the type of sequence (i.e., gradual, 
repeat or random).
Each of our key hypotheses was addressed in the follow-
ing ways:
1. To evaluate whether updating impairments seen in RBD 
patients can be explained by a failure to explore, we 
calculated the difference in performance between the 
random–gradual conditions. We know that healthy indi-
viduals tend to switch categories earlier in the morph 
Table 1  Expected outcome vs. 
actual outcome
Summary of expected vs. actual results for all three hypotheses (i.e., exploration, proactive switch, percep-
tual/attentional bias) potentially explaining the updating impairment seen in RBD patients. The second row 
refers to the condition that was used to evaluate the hypothesis. Please note that results are only displayed 
for HCO matched on cognitive status
Exploration Proactive switch Perceptual/attentional bias
Test (condition) ΔRandom–gradual Repeat Random
Expected RBD < LBD&HCO RBD > LBD&HCO RBD ≠ LBD & HCO
Actual RBD < LBD&HCO ✓ RBD = LBD&HCO ✗ (?) RBD = LBD & HCO ✗
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series when presented in a gradual context (e.g., when 
the object is still 60% shark and only 40% plane) than 
when single images from the same sequence are pre-
sented in isolation, outside the morphing context (Egré 
et al. 2013; Raffman 2011; Stöttinger et al. 2016; see 
Egré et al. 2018 for review). This suggests that healthy 
individuals are exploring alternative interpretations 
conditional on the evolving history they have viewed 
(e.g., “I know it was a shark but what else could it be? 
A bird?”). In the context of the rock–paper–scissors 
game, we found that RBD patients explored a lim-
ited selection of alternative strategies (Danckert et al. 
2012b) and employed less efficient exploration strate-
gies (Sepahvand et al. 2014). If updating impairments 
in RBD patients are due to a generic failure to explore 
alternatives evident across different tasks and domains, 
we expect them to show no benefit from the contextual 
information provided by the gradual morphing sequence 
(Egré et al. 2013; Raffman 2011; Stöttinger et al. 2016; 
Table 1, second row).
2. To evaluate whether RBD patients would always strug-
gle to proactively shift to a new interpretation, (irrespec-
tive of whether they are naïve as to the second object), 
we compared performance in the repeat condition across 
participant groups. Evidence that RBD impairs the abil-
ity to make proactive decisions comes from research 
using ambiguous or bistable figures such as the Rubin’s 
face/vase picture or the Necker cube in which healthy 
individuals typically alternate between two mutually 
exclusive interpretations (see Long and Toppino 2004 
for review). Given that the sensory input is stable, the 
switch to a new interpretation is internally generated 
by the participant. Research shows that performance 
in an ambiguous figures task of this kind is associated 
with the right hemisphere, with damage to right frontal 
cortex resulting in significant impairment in switching 
to the second interpretation (Meenan and Miller 1994). 
Furthermore, right frontal and parietal areas are active 
during proactive alternations between two percepts 
(Britz et al. 2009, 2011; Sterzer and Kleinschmidt 2007; 
Weilnhammer et al. 2013; Zaretskaya et al. 2010). So 
if RBD patients have a general impairment in proac-
tively switching to a new interpretation irrespective of 
whether or not they know what the second object will 
be, we expect them to identify the second object later 
compared to other participant groups in the repeat condi-
tion (Table 1, third row).
  At this point, it is also worth noting that gradual 
updating should not be confused with set-shifting. 
While participants have to react to a salient mismatch 
in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; i.e., an 
action that was considered “correct” suddenly becomes 
“incorrect”; Grant and Berg 1948), updating in our tasks 
rests on the accumulation of gradual changes in a noisy 
environment; participants proactively decide at which 
point their current model is no longer supported by the 
evidence. Indeed, we found that while RBD patients 
showed a selective updating impairment, there was no 
difference between RBD and LBD patients in a card 
sorting test akin to the WCST (Danckert et al. 2012b; 
Stöttinger et al. 2014; Piper et al. 2012).
3. Lastly, to assess the contribution of general post-stroke 
visual or attentional impairments (Hepworth et al. 2015), 
we compared the performance of RBD patients with the 
performance of control groups in the random condition. 
Damage to the right hemisphere often results in an atten-
tional bias towards the ipsilesional side (i.e., neglect; 
Danckert et al. 2012a). This could have potentially hin-
dered the capacity of RBD patients to correctly identify 
small changes in our original study, and consequently 
to update to a new model. If the updating impairment 
in RBD patients is due to a general perceptual and/or 
attentional impairment, we expect RBD patients to per-
form differently than LBD patients when pictures are 
presented individually outside of the morphing context 
(i.e., random condition; Table 1, right column).
One major assumption of our study is that the benefit 
for the gradual over the random presentation sequence is 
indicative of active exploration. While this benefit has also 
been reported elsewhere in the literature (see Egré et al. 
2018 for review), to our knowledge our study was the only 
one that showed this benefit in the context of morphing 
objects (Stöttinger et al. 2016). In the original study, we 
used a between subjects design. We therefore first evalu-
ated in an online study whether we can replicate the effect 
when the type of presentation (gradual vs. random) is 
manipulated within participants—a non-trivial point given 
the ongoing discussion about failures to replicate in psy-
chological science (Bohannon 2015).
Methods
Prior to the patient study, we conducted an online study to 
determine the benefit of gradual presentations in a within 
subject design (Stöttinger et al. 2016). The same picture 
sets used in the online study were then used in the patient 
study. Besides the need to replicate the effect, the online 
study also allowed us to have a reference point for the 
performance of healthy, younger individuals. Results of 
the online study are included in the graphs depicting the 
results of patients and healthy seniors for comparison 
purposes.
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Participants
Online study
Seventy-seven participants (33 female) recruited through 
Mechanical Turk, and between 19 and 53  years of age 
(mean 35.34, SD 9.62) participated in this study [Cauca-
sian/white (80.50%), Hispanic (7.8%), African American 
(5.2%), East Asian (3.9%)]. Participants received $1.50 for 
their participation.
Patient study
Four groups were tested in this study—RBD patients, LBD 
patients, younger (≤ 70 years; i.e., HCO-age-matched) and 
older (> 70 years; i.e., HCO-cognitively-matched) healthy 
seniors. Patients were recruited from the Neurological 
Patient Database of the University of Waterloo (Heart and 
Stroke Foundation funded). Of the 13 LBD patients three 
were excluded due to Montreal Cognitive Assessment 
(MoCA; Nasreddine et al. 2005) scores in the demented 
range (N = 2; MoCA ≤ 9). This score was considerably 
lower than the optimal cutoff point for vascular demen-
tia (i.e., MoCA < 17; Freitas et al. 2012). One patient was 
excluded due to a failure to find any discernible lesion on 
available brain scans (N = 1). The final sample of LBD 
patients comprised ten patients (2 female, mean age 61.28 
years, ± 14.47). Nine of these patients were stroke patients. 
In one patient (#835), brain damage was due to a resection 
of an arterial vascular malformation. Twelve RBD patients 
(2 female, mean age 65.88 years ± 10.13) participated. All 
of them were stroke survivors. Demographics for all patients 
are in Table 2 with lesions shown in Fig. 1. Patients were 
screened for neglect upon admission to the database and 
again prior to the experiment using the Behavioral Inat-
tention Test (BIT; Wilson et al. 1987). Six RBD patients 
showed neglect at initial screening, with two showing 
chronic neglect at testing (#284, #744). No LBD patient 
showed neglect. Six of the ten LBD patients were reported 
to have aphasia when admitted to the database. One LBD 
patient experienced slight word finding difficulties at testing. 
He was able to describe all the objects and his answers could 
be reliably coded as either the first or the second object.
Nineteen healthy older controls were recruited from the 
University of Waterloo’s Research in Aging Participant Pool. 
This pool recruits community dwelling seniors for participa-
tion in studies on aging. Thus, our HCO were enrolled based 
on age. We subdivided our healthy older controls into two 
subgroups. One matched to our clinical participants based on 
age, and another based on MOCA scores to equate cognitive 
ability. The former group (HCO-age-matched) was under 
70 years of age, while the second subgroup (HCO-cogni-
tively-matched) was over 70 years of age. After recruitment 
one of the healthy elders was found to have had a past neu-
rological illness, and was excluded from further analyses. 
The final sample of 18 participants consisted of nine who 
were 70 years or younger (HCO-age-matched: 9 females, 
mean age 66.35 years, ± 3.35) and nine older than 70 years 
(HCO-cognitively-matched: 6 female, mean age 78.55 years, 
± 3.32). The HCO-cognitively-matched control group had a 
nominally lower MOCA score than the HCO-age-matched 
group, but the two control groups did not differ statisti-
cally {HCO-cognitively-matched mean = 25.78, ± 2.44 
vs. HCO-age-matched mean = 27.78, ± 1.86; [t(16) = 1.96, 
p = .068]}. Six of the HCO had a MoCA score between 25 
and 22, potentially indicating a mild cognitive impairment 
(Smith et al. 2007; Nasreddine et al. 2005; but see; Lee et al. 
2008 and; Luis et al. 2009 for the argument of lower cut-off 
points).
The MoCA for LBD (mean 24.79, ± 2.36) and RBD 
patients (mean 24.50, ± 2.84) was lower than that of the 
HCO-age-matched group (all p’s < .01), but comparable to 
that of the HCO-cognitively-matched group (all p’s > .25). 
There was no significant difference in MoCA scores of LBD 
and RBD patients [t(20) = 0.18, p = .86]. LBD and RBD 
were of comparable age [t(20) = 0.87, p = .40]. Both groups 
were significantly younger than the HCO-cognitively-
matched group (all p’s > .01) but comparable in age to the 
HCO-age-matched group (all p’s > .30). Also, there was no 
significant difference for time since stroke or lesion volume 
between the RBD and LBD patients (all p’s > .05).
The University of Waterloo’s Office of Research Ethics 
approved the protocol for both studies—online and patient 
study. Participants on both studies gave informed written 
consent prior to participation according to the Declaration 
of Helsinki, by either clicking on the “I agree” button (online 
study), or by signing the consent letter (patient study).
Stimuli and design
Each participant saw eight picture sets selected from a larger 
set validated in an earlier study (Stöttinger et al. 2016; https 
://osf.io/qi2vg /). All images were a standard size (316 × 316 
pixels) displayed on a white background. Four sets were 
presented in a gradual order, four in random order. In the 
gradual condition one common object morphed over 15 iter-
ations into a different object (Stöttinger et al. 2014, 2016). 
Two of these sets were presented again, but in reverse order 
(i.e., repeat condition).
In the random condition, four picture sets were pre-
sented in a random order. Pictures from these sets were 
randomly assigned to four new series with 15 pictures 
in each. Each random series contained the same number 
of pictures from each picture set and each part within a 
series. That is, each random series had five pictures from 
the first third of the morphing series (pictures #1 to #5); 
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Table 2  Demographics for patients (a) and HCO (b)
a Neglect at time of screening (band at time of testing)
ID Lesion volume Age (years) Time since stroke 
(years)
MoCA Gender Education 
(years)
(a) Demographics (patients)
 LBD patients
  110 65 64 8.67 23 Male 12
  442 8127 68 12.44 23 Male 14
  588 274 68 3.25 28 Male 20
  788 328 35 1.84 22 Male 15
  828 7374 76 1.44 25 Female 17
  835 7573 35 1.39 25 Male 14
  838 105 69 1.41 26 Male 23
  872 665 71 0.89 23 Male 10
  898+ 5396 66 0.48 23 Male 8
  902+ 161 61 1.76 29 Female 12
 RBD patients
  27a 21,187 49 8.37 27 Male 15
  205a 3742 62 6.69 29 Male 14
  228 6316 86 6.62 26 Female 11
  284b 14,203 74 6.95 22 Female 12
  489a 1693 71 4.36 24 Male 15
  729a 5758 66 2.30 22 Male 14
  744b 21,479 73 3.60 25 Male 24
  792 5878 64 1.67 24 Male 15
  856 232 55 0.87 26 Male 16
  874 5026 56 1.16 26 Male 14
  932 1520 62 0.26 25 Male 16
  946 5694 72 0.20 18 Male 20
ID Age (years) MoCA Gender Education 
(years)
(b) Demographics (healthy controls)
 Younger healthy controls (≤ 70 years)
  1 61 28 Female 20
  46 64 28 Female 17
  110 69 27 Female 17
  143 68 30 Female 16
  193 62 30 Female 12
  230 69 28 Female 18
  249 70 25 Female 24
  351 67 25 Female 16
  408 68 29 Female 16
 Older healthy controls (> 70 years)
  3 76 25 Male 17
  32 76 22 Female 13
  37 76 27 Female 17
  148 81 23 Female 22
  206 80 26 Male 20
  208 81 28 Female 14
  321 81 30 Female 18
  369 83 25 Female 13
  409 73 26 Male 16
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five pictures from the middle (pictures #6 to #10), and five 
pictures from the end of each series (pictures #11 to #15). 
In each of the eight picture sets, one additional object was 
presented after the third and twelfth pictures as catch tri-
als. Catch trials assessed whether participants were simply 
perseverating (Fig. 2; Stöttinger et al. 2016).
The presentation of each set (gradual or random), the 
order of presentation (random then gradual or vice versa), 
as well as order of the series (series 1, 2, 3, 4, 1, 3 vs. 3, 
1, 4, 2, 1, 3), was varied between participants resulting 
in eight versions. Versions were counterbalanced across 
participants.
Fig. 1  Lesion tracings RBD (a) and LBD patients (b) superimposed on the MNI template. Lesions shown in neurological convention
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Fig. 1  (continued)
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Procedure
Online study
The online study questionnaires were designed using Qual-
trics©. Participants first filled out demographic questions 
before being assigned to one of eight task versions using the 
randomize function of Qualtrics©, and yielding roughly the 
same number of participants for each task order (n = 39 did 
random, gradual, repeat and 38 did gradual, repeat, random). 
Prior to the gradual condition, participants were informed 
they would see six different picture series, containing 17 
images and that each series would begin with a commonly 
known object before changing gradually to show a different 
object by the end of the series. In the random condition, 
participants were told they would see 68 pictures of objects. 
In all conditions, participants saw one picture at a time and 
typed their answer underneath the picture. The next picture 
was revealed by clicking a button at the bottom of the screen. 
On average, participants needed 20 min (± 15 min) to com-
plete the questionnaire. Time to complete the questionnaire 
did not correlate with any of the dependent measures in our 
task (all p’s > .05).
There were a small number of technical glitches (< 1% 
of all image presentations). For 29 image presentations 
(0.22%), the wrong picture was presented at the first picture 
position of a series (e.g., a saw instead of a shark). From 
our initial study, we know that these pictures are never rated 
as the “second object”. These items were therefore coded 
as “first object” reports. In one version, (a picture of a saw 
was presented instead of the correct picture at picture posi-
tion #10). If this happened between a switch of percepts, 
the set was removed (seven individual cases). Otherwise, 
it was rated as the answer which preceded and followed the 
erroneous presentation. Infrequently, participants failed to 
answer (i.e., 0.19% of images). Most of these omissions were 
preceded and followed by the same response, suggesting no 
change in the participant’s conscious percept. In ten cases, 
the omission occurred between a switch in report. These 
sets were removed from further analysis. Importantly, per-
formance in the current online study was the same as in 
Stöttinger et al. (2016) (all p’s > .05).
Patient study
All assessments and tasks were done in the same order for 
each patient: BIT, MoCA, picture morphing task. Partici-
pants were tested individually in a room at the University 
of Waterloo. In a few cases, participants were tested at their 
own home. Instructions were presented on a screen and 
repeated verbally to the participants before each condition 
in the picture morphing task. Participants saw one picture 
at a time and were asked to tell us for each picture what 
they saw. Answers were recorded and transcribed after the 
experiment. Each picture was preceded and followed by a 
fixation cross. Patients and healthy participants received $10 
per hour of study for their participation.
Data analysis
Behavioral data
Responses were coded as seeing the “first object”, or seeing 
an object other than the first object (i.e., “second object”). In 
addition, we evaluated whether the catch trials were identi-
fied correctly. For repeated sequences, the coding as first or 
second object was done based on the ordering used in the 
morphing sequence. For example, when a picture set mor-
phed from a shark to a plane in the gradual condition, and 
from a plane to a shark in the repeat condition, “shark” was 
coded as first object in the gradual condition, with “plane” 
coded as first object in the repeat condition. While the cod-
ing was not done blindly, it did use a list of validated pic-
ture terms from Stöttinger et al. (2016; https ://osf.io/qi2vg 
/), and was done independently by the first two authors 
with an interrater agreement of 98.98% for the online study 
and 99.13% for the patient study. The high agreement is 
explained by the fact that there was little opportunity for 
Fig. 2  Objects morphed over 15 iterations from object 1 into object 
2 (gradual condition), or vice versa (repeat condition). In the random 
condition, objects were presented individually, outside of the mor-
phing context (e.g., second picture of the gun-hair dryer picture set 
the ninth picture of the spider-sun picture set, etc.)
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ambiguity. The majority of answers in the online study 
were less than three words (one word, e.g., “frog”; 90.45%; 
two words, e.g., “Jumping man”; 8.81%; or three words, 
e.g., “man jumping up”; 0.47%). In only 0.28%, the answer 
included more than three words. Most answers in the patient 
study were also less than four words (73%). Participants 
in the patient study, however, were more prone to longer 
answers with 9.44% containing ten words or more.
On a few occasions (2.18%), patient responses indicated 
more than one object (e.g., “jet turning into a shark”). Most 
of these were in the random condition (only 0.63% of indi-
vidual responses in the gradual or repeat condition). Follow-
ing the procedure of our initial study (Stöttinger et al. 2014), 
answers in the gradual and repeat condition were coded as 
“second object” as soon as the second object was mentioned. 
In 1.54% of individual responses both objects were named in 
the random condition. In cases where the participant stated 
explicitly which object he/she preferred (e.g., “It could be a 
cat or a rabbit. But it looks more like a rabbit”) answers were 
coded based on the indicated preference. Applying this rule, 
0.51% of individual answers were coded as “first object”, 
and 0.44% of individual answers were coded as “second 
object”. When answers could not unambiguously assigned 
to either object (e.g., “airplane or shark possibly”), answers 
were always coded as “second object” (0.32%). We repeated 
analyses in Sect. Difference: random minus gradual using 
only the coding of when patient participants first reported 
the second object (and ignoring a stated preference) with 
no change in the pattern of results or statistically significant 
findings.
Lesion tracing
The most recent available clinical CT (17) or MRI (five) 
scan was obtained for each patient. All scans were aligned 
to the anterior commissure in SPM8. Lesions were traced 
manually in MRIcron (Rorden et al. 2007) and spatially nor-
malized using the Clinical Toolbox in SPM (Rorden et al. 
2012). Common involvement of brain-damaged regions 
across different patient groups was identified by overlapping 
individual normalized brain lesions on a standard template 
(i.e., AICHA—An atlas of intrinsic connectivity of homo-
topic areas; Joliot et al. 2015) in MRIcron. A summary of the 
location and size of participant lesions was obtained using 
the descriptive tool. Due to our small sample size, these data 
are underpowered for statistical analyses of lesion location 
and performance scores [e.g., voxel-based lesion-symptom 
mapping; (VLSM; Bates et al. 2003)]. Thus, while acknowl-
edging the exploratory nature of the data, we include them 
for comparison with prior reports, and for the purpose of 
generating structure–function hypotheses (Danckert et al. 
2012b; Stöttinger et al. 2014, 2015).
Statistical analysis
Data were analyzed using repeated measures ANOVA. In the 
online study, the mean percentages of first object reports (aver-
aged over all sets per condition) were submitted to a repeated 
measures ANOVA with image number (15 morphing images 
from 100% first object to 0% first object) and condition (grad-
ual vs. random) as within subject factors. Separate repeated 
measure analyses for each condition (gradual, random, repeat) 
were calculated for the patient study with the image number 
(15 morphing images from 100% first object to 0% first object) 
as a within subject factor and participant group (LBD, RBD 
and HCO) as a between subject factor. In Sect. Difference: ran-
dom minus gradual, we calculate a difference score between 
first object reports in the random and gradual conditions (ran-
dom–gradual) with positive numbers indicating a benefit for 
gradual presentations. The difference score was entered into 
a univariate ANOVA with participant group (LBD, RBD 
and HCO) as the independent variable. Analyses were calcu-
lated separately—(1) with the HCO-age-matched group, (2) 
with the HCO-cognitively matched group as controls and (3) 
restricted to RBD and LBD participant groups. Given that both 
patient groups suffered from brain injury this was considered 
the most meaningful comparison. Statistically significant main 
effects were further analyzed by a post-hoc Bonferroni tests as 
implemented in SPSS; t tests were used for post-hoc interac-
tion analyses (Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons). 
Statistical test were two-tailed and an alpha level of p < .05 was 
used to determine significance.
In cases where the standard statistical tests failed to reject 
the null, we turned to Bayes Factors to assess whether the 
null was more probable than the alternative. Specifically, the 
Bayes factor allowed us to evaluate whether the differences 
between RBD and LBD represent (a) evidence for H1 [RBD 
performance being worse than LBD (Bayes factor ≥ 3)], (b) 
evidence for the null hypothesis of no performance difference 
(Bayes factor ≤ 0.33) or whether the data were not sensitive 
enough to confidently distinguish between the two alternatives 
(Bayes factor > 0.33 and < 3). Our cut-offs used were those 
recommended by Dienes (2014). One advantage of Bayes fac-
tors is their robustness to small sample sizes that are under-
powered for conventional analyses (Vadillo et al. 2016). Bayes 
factors were calculated using the online-calculator provided 
by Dienes http://www.lifes ci.susse x.ac.uk/home/Zolta n_Diene 
s/infer ence/Bayes .htm and where effect sizes came from our 
previous study (Stöttinger et al. 2014).
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Results
Online study
Seventy six of the 77 participants reported all catch trials 
correctly. Mean percentages of first object reports are dis-
played in Fig. 3. We refrained from comparing performance 
in the repeat condition with either the gradual or random 
conditions as morphing direction was not counterbalanced. 
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main 
effect for picture position [F(14,1064) = 2543.29, p < .001, 
η2 = .97]. As evident in Fig. 3, probability of first answer 
reports decreased as a function of picture position. A sig-
nificant main effect for condition [F(1,76) = 31.35, p < .001, 
η2 = .29] showed that participants reported significantly 
fewer first objects in the gradual (mean 7.36, SD 0.76) com-
pared to the random condition (mean 8.00, SD 0.72). The 
interaction between condition x picture position showed that 
participants reported the second object earlier in the grad-
ual compared to the random context [F(14,1064) = 13.04, 
p < .001, η2 = .15]: at picture #7, 8, 9 and 11 probability of 
first object reports was significantly lower in the gradual 
compared to the random condition (all p’s < .05). These find-
ings replicate Stöttinger et al. (2016).
Patients
Patient participants identified all catch trials correctly, with 
the exception of one patient on one occasion. One set for one 
patient in the random condition was excluded from further 
analysis as the patient did not recognize one object (i.e., the 
patient failed to identify the spider in the spider–sun pic-
ture set even at the first picture position—100% spider/0% 
sun). See Table 3 for average performance in all three con-
ditions for all groups (note: smaller numbers reflect better 
performance).
Gradual condition
Compared to the HCO-age-matched group, results dem-
onstrated a significant main effect for image number 
[F(14,392) = 353.04, p < .001, η2 = .93] due to a decrease 
of first object reports as a function of picture position, 
as well as a significant main effect for participant group 
[F(2,28) = 9.47, p = .001, η2 = .40] (Fig. 4, left panel). A 
post hoc Bonferroni test showed that age-matched HCO and 
LBD patients had a comparable percentage of first object 
reports (p = .16). Age-matched HCO had a significantly 
lower percentage of first object reports than RBD patients 
(p = .001). This analysis also demonstrated a significant 
interaction between image number and participant group 
[F(14,392) = 3.53, p < .001, η2 = .20]. Independent samples t 
test (Bonferroni corrected) revealed that both patient groups 
showed a significantly higher percentage of first object 
reports at picture image #9 and 10 compared to HCO-age 
matched controls.
The same repeated measures analysis restricted to patient 
groups (i.e., RBD vs. LBD) demonstrated a significant main 
effect for picture position [F(14,280) = 206.97, p < .001, 
η2 = .91] and a marginally significant main effect for par-
ticipant group: RBD patients tended to have a higher pro-
portion of first object reports compared to LBD patients 
[F(1,20) = 4.12, p = .056, η2 = .17]. To further evaluate the 
difference in LBD and RBD first object reports, we calcu-
lated the Bayes factor (Dienes 2014). We found a Bayes fac-
tor of 3.24, indicating support for a greater updating impair-
ment after damage to the right side of the brain.
The same analysis conducted with the HCO-cognitively 
matched group revealed similar results. There was a sig-
nificant main effect for image number [F(14,392) = 301.09, 
p < .001, η2 = .92] and participant group [F(2,28) = 5.33, 
p = .011, η2 = .28]. Age-matched HCO had a comparable 
percentage of first object reports to LBD patients (p = .88), 
and a significantly lower percentage of first object reports 
than RBD patients (p = .01).
This analysis also showed a significant interac-
tion between picture position and participant group 
[F(28,392) = 1.55, p = .038, η2 = .10]. HCO-cognitively 
matched controls showed a comparable percentage of first 
object reports to LBD patients at all picture positions (all 
p’s > .05), and significantly lower percentage of first object 
reports than RBD patients at picture #7 (p = .048) (Fig. 4).
Fig. 3  Average % of first object reports in the online study col-
lapsed across all picture sets and all participants in each condition. 
The x-axis represents picture position (100% first object to 0% first 
object). Participants stopped reporting the first object earlier, when 
it was presented in the gradual condition (blue line) compared to the 
random condition (red line). At picture #8 (i.e., vertical dotted line), 
the picture was composed equally of both pictures (for interpretation 
of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to 
the web version of this article)
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Table 3  Average performance of patients (a) and HCO (b)
a Neglect at time of screening (band at time of testing): please note that there was no significant difference in any of the dependent measures 
between participants who showed neglect at screening (or at the time of this testing) and other RBD patients (all p’s > .05)
c Time since stroke was significantly longer than time since stroke for the other patients [t(20) = 15.58, p < .01]. This, however, did not result in 
better performance in this patient as evident in the table
Italic values represent performance 2 SDs outside the range of controls
ID Gradual Random Repeat Difference
(a) Performance of patients
 Left brain damaged patients
  110 6.00 8.50 7.50 2.50
  442c 8.50 8.75 6.50 0.25
  588 5.75 6.50 7.00 0.75
  788 7.50 8.50 9.00 1.00
  828 7.75 7.50 7.00 − 0.25
  835 6.25 6.25 6.50 0.00
  838 7.50 7.25 9.50 − 0.25
  872 7.75 7.00 9.00 − 0.75
  898 8.50 9.00 10.00 0.50
  902 8.00 7.75 6.50 − 0.25
 Right brain damaged patients
  27a 7.25 8.00 7.50 0.75
  205a 8.50 7.75 8.00 − 0.75
  228 9.50 7.00 8.50 − 2.50
  284b 10.25 6.75 7.00 − 3.50
  489a 8.50 9.75 8.00 1.25
  729 7.50 7.25 6.00 − 0.25
  744b 9.25 7.25 10.50 − 2.00
  792 9.75 6.75 10.00 − 3.00
  856 6.75 7.00 5.50 0.25
  874 6.50 5.75 7.00 − 0.75
  932 7.25 8.50 11.50 1.25
  946 9.25 7.25 10.00 − 2.00
ID Gradual Random Random Difference
(b) Performance of healthy controls
 HCO (≤ 70 years) (age-matched)
  1 6.25 7.25 6.00 1.00
  46 5.75 7.00 5.50 1.25
  110 6.75 7.25 9.50 0.50
  143 6.75 7.50 7.00 0.75
  193 6.25 7.50 5.50 1.25
  230 6.25 8.00 7.50 1.75
  249 6.25 8.50 6.00 2.25
  351 6.00 7.75 7.00 1.75
  408 7.50 7.25 6.00 − 0.25
 HCO (>70 years) (cognitively-matched)
  3 5.75 8.00 8.50 2.25
  32 6.25 7.25 6.00 1.00
  37 7.75 6.80 7.50 − 0.95
  148 7.25 7.75 8.50 0.50
  206 7.50 8.25 8.50 0.75
  208 8.00 7.00 5.50 − 1.00
  321 5.00 6.75 6.00 1.75
  369 6.75 9.50 8.00 2.75
  409 7.00 7.25 8.50 0.25
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Random condition
The same analyses conducted for averaged percentage of 
first object reports in the random condition revealed a signif-
icant main effect for image number for both analyses—with 
age-matched HCO as controls [F(14,392) = 403.85, p < .001, 
η2 = .94] and with HCO matched on cognitive impairment 
[F(14,392) = 361.12, p < .001, η2 = .93]. Percentage of first 
object reports decreased as a function of picture position 
in both analyses. No other effects or interactions were sig-
nificant (all p’s > .05) indicating that all groups performed 
at equivalent levels (Fig. 4). A Bayes factor of 0.13 for the 
difference between RBD and LBD patients confirmed the 
likelihood of equal performance between the two patient 
groups.
Repeat condition
The percentage of first object reports in the repeat condi-
tion was submitted to the same repeated measures ANOVA 
described above and revealed a significant main effect 
for image number with HCO-age-matched as controls 
[F(14,392) = 140.03, p < .001, η2 = .83]: the percentage of 
first object reports decreased as a function of picture posi-
tion. We also found a trend towards a significant effect for 
participant group [F(2,28) = 2.82, p = .077, η2 = .17]. HCO-
age-matched controls showed a slight, but not significantly 
lower percentage of first object reports compared to RBD 
patients (p = .075), and a comparable performance to LBD 
patients (p = .76). Calculating the analysis for patient groups 
only (RBD vs. LBD) revealed a significant main effect for 
picture position, again showing a decrease of first object 
reports as a function of picture position [F(14, 280) = 99.94, 
p < .001, η2 = .83]. No other main effect or interaction 
reached significance (all p’s > .05). While RBD and LBD 
patients demonstrated comparable performance, a Bayes fac-
tor of 0.57 suggest that our data is not sensitive enough to 
draw a definite conclusion of no patient group differences.
The same repeated measures ANOVA conducted with 
HCO-cognitively-matched controls revealed no significant 
effect other than a significant main effect for image posi-
tion [F(14,392) = 141.84, p < .001, η2 = .84]. No significant 
difference was found for average percentage of first object 
reports between HCO-cognitively matched and LBD (p = 1) 
or RBD patients (p = .68). Results therefore demonstrate that 
when the control group was matched for cognitive impair-
ment, no difference was found between groups (Fig. 4).
Difference: random minus gradual
Healthy individuals see the second object earlier when 
the pictures are presented in a gradual morphing context 
(Fig. 3). We submitted the difference scores (average pro-
portion of first object reports in random–gradual conditions; 
Table 3) to two separate univariate ANOVAs with partici-
pant group (RBD, LBD, and either HCO-age matched or 
HCO-cognitively matched) as the between subject factor. 
Larger values for this difference score indicate greater ben-
efit from the gradual condition. The analysis with HCO-age 
matched as a control group showed a significant main effect 
(Fig. 5) [F(2,28) = 7.74, p = .002, η2 = .36]. RBD patients 
had significantly smaller difference scores compared to LBD 
patients [F(1,20) = 4.82, p = .04, η2 = .19] and HCO-age-
matched controls: F(1,19) = 12.25, p = .002, η2 = .39; LBD 
patients tended to have smaller difference compared to age-
matched HCO [F(1,17) = 4.12, p = .058, η2 = .20].
Fig. 4  Average % of first object reports for gradual (left) random 
(middle) and repeat (right) conditions. The x-axis represents picture 
position (100% first object to 0% first object). At the vertical dot-
ted line, the picture is composed of 50% first object and 50% second 
object. Green lines = LBD, red lines = RBD, black lines = HCO-Under 
70, gray lines = HCO-Over 70. Results from the online study are 
included for comparison purposes (blue dotted lines = HCO-online) 
(for interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the 
reader is referred to the web version of this article)
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The same analysis done for HCO-cognitively-matched 
group as controls also showed a significant main effect 
[F(2,28) = 4.85, p = .016, η2 = .26]. HCO-cognitively 
matched controls showed a significantly larger benefit for 
gradual vs. random presentation than did RBD patients 
[F(1,19) = 6.88, p = .017, η2 = .27] and a comparable benefit 
to LBD patients [F(1,17) = 0.81, p = .381, η2 = .05].
Healthy controls—age effects
The two HCO groups differed on age in the gradual con-
dition only. The HCO-age-matched (≤ 70  years) group 
stopped reporting the first object earlier compared to the 
HCO-cognitively-matched (> 70 years) counterparts as evi-
dent in a significant interaction between image number x 
participant group (age matched vs. cognitively matched) 
[F(14,224) = 1.92, p = .026, η2 = .11] (Fig. 4, left panel). 
None of the other conditions revealed a significant differ-
ence between the two control groups (all p’s > .05).
Lesion overlay analysis
Among the 12 RBD patients, nine had overlapping lesions 
in the insula (anterior and posterior), rolandic operculum, 
and the putamen. Five RBD patients were considered poor 
explorers based on average first object reports and difference 
scores more than two SDs above the mean of the HCO-cog-
nitively matched group (highlighted by gray bars in Table 3). 
Four of these five patients had common involvement in the 
inferior frontal cortex, precentral gyrus, insula (anterior and 
posterior), rolandic operculum, superior temporal gyrus, 
and the putamen (Fig. 6). Four RBD patients showed a poor 
general switching performance as indicated by average first 
object reports that were two SDs above the mean of the 
HCO-cognitively matched group in the repeat condition. 
Three of these patients had overlap in the parietal cortex 
(postcentral, supramarginal gyrus, angular gyrus, inferior 
parietal gyrus, intraparietal sulcus), and the posterior insula 
and superior temporal gyrus (Fig. 6). LBD patients demon-
strated less overlap in their lesions than did the RBD group 
with only four of ten patients showing common involvement 
of the putamen.
Discussion
The aim of the present work was to explore why RBD 
patients show a selective and differential impairment of 
mental model updating, and to replicate results of our ear-
lier study (Stöttinger et al. 2014). As in our previous study, 
RBD patients needed significantly more pictures than HCO 
before they reported seeing the second object in the gradual 
morphing condition—even after controlling for general 
cognitive impairment (Fig. 4). Comparisons between LBD 
and RBD groups found clear evidence for worse updating 
in RBD patients (Bayes Factor 3.24). Further, five of the 12 
RBD patients, but none of the ten LBD patients, performed 
well outside the average performance of the control group 
(i.e., mean of HCO-cognitively-matched ± 2 SD; Table 3).
To test whether the updating impairment in RBD patients 
reflects (1) an inability to explore new hypotheses, (2) a 
general impairment of proactive switching or (3) a more 
general perceptual and/or attentional impairment, we com-
pared three conditions: gradual, random and repeat. All 
groups performed at the same level in the random condition, 
indicating that basic perceptual, attentional, and language 
capacities were equivalent in all participant groups (Bayes 
factor of 0.13). To test whether RBD performance was due 
to impaired ability to explore alternative interpretations, we 
compared first object reports in the random condition with 
the gradual condition. In healthy individuals, we consist-
ently find that participants report the second object earlier 
when presented in a gradual context (Stöttinger et al. 2016; 
Fig. 3), reflective of active exploration strategies (i.e., “It 
was a shark but it could also be a plane or a bird.”). In the 
online study, we replicated this benefit showing the robust-
ness of this effect. This is an important point given the ongo-
ing discussion about failures to replicate in social science 
(Bohannon 2015). Results in the patient study showed a sig-
nificant difference between participant groups in how much 
they benefited from the gradual presentation. The strong-
est effect was seen in healthy age-matched controls. This 
benefit decreased with age and was about the same in the 
older seniors (matched on general cognitive impairment) as 
in LBD patients (Fig. 5). In contrast, RBD patients exhibited 
a perceptual hysteresis—becoming “stuck” on their initial 
interpretation even as the pictures gradually morphed into 
Fig. 5  Average (95% CI) difference scores (random–gradual) for 
LBD (green), RBD (red), HCO-age-matched and HCO-cognitively-
matched (gray). Results of healthy young participants from the online 
study are included for comparison purposes (blue) (for interpretation 
of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to 
the web version of this article)
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Fig. 6  Lesion overlay maps for LBD and RBD patients (top panel). Bottom panel shows 4 of the 5 RBD patients who were considered poor 
explorers (left panel) and 3 of the 4 RBD patients, considered poor proactive updaters (right panel). Shading indicates the amount of overlap
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something else. Combined with our previous work (Danck-
ert et al. 2012b; Stöttinger et al. 2014), this indicates that 
RBD participants are aware that things are changing in the 
perceptual representation they are forming, but are defi-
cient in exploring alternative models to encapsulate those 
changes. That is, our RBD patients’ verbal reports of the 
morphing images indicate that they perceive changes. What 
differentiated them from controls and LBD patients was 
that they interpreted those changes within the context of 
their initial perceptual representation. Indeed, if the task we 
employed depended heavily on detecting the small (~ 4%) 
changes from one image to the next, one might assume that 
it would be LBD that would lead to the greatest impairment, 
as damage to this hemisphere is known to affect local as 
opposed to global image processing (Martinez et al. 1997; 
Robertson and Lamb 1991). Therefore, we suggest that the 
deficit seen here in RBD patients is indicative of a failure to 
adapt to changing circumstances as they struggle to explore 
alternate hypotheses to explain the change.
Data in the repeat condition are harder to interpret given 
the smaller number of observations (i.e., two instead of four 
sets). In the repeat condition, there is no need to explore 
alternate hypotheses—participants know that the plane will 
morph into a shark; they have seen it before. All that remains 
is for participants to determine when to report seeing the 
shark. Performance of RBD patients as a group was not dif-
ferent from that of LBD patients or cognitively matched con-
trols in the repeat condition (Fig. 4). However, our rejection 
of the proactive switch account rests on the strength of a 
null result, and our Bayes factor of 0.57 suggests that these 
negative data are not strong. Further comparisons of gradual 
and repeat conditions will be necessary to evaluate whether 
updating impairments in RBD patients are due only to fail-
ures of hypothesis exploration, proactive switching, or both.
Although RBD patients performed more poorly than HCO 
and LBD patients, it is also evident that performance within 
the RBD patients was heterogeneous (Table 3). Some RBD 
patients performed within the norm of cognitively-matched 
controls, while others were outside this range. There was 
also heterogeneity in the type of impairment observed, with 
some patients only impaired in one regard (e.g., exploring) 
while others had broader impairments (Table 3). Given our 
sample sizes the lesion overlay analyses should be regarded 
as exploratory. Nevertheless, they are consistent with general 
ideas about the systems important for adapting to chang-
ing and uncertain circumstances. A failure to explore was 
mostly associated with damage to frontal regions (frontal 
operculum, insula), while a general impairment in alternat-
ing between interpretations (as indexed by the repeat condi-
tion) was associated more prominently with parietal dam-
age (Fig. 6). In healthy individuals, an association between 
the right insula—commonly damaged in our patients—and 
exploration of alternative interpretations in stochastic and 
uncertain environments has been found by several groups 
(Blanchard and Gershman 2018; Ohira et al. 2013, 2014; 
Laureiro-Martínez et al. 2015). When we presented healthy 
individuals with some of the gradually morphing picture sets 
used here in an fMRI experiment, we found that the anterior 
insula was active not only at the actual time point of reported 
object change but also about five seconds before—consistent 
with the involvement of the anterior insula in the explora-
tion of alternative choices (Stöttinger et al. 2015). We have 
recently replicated this finding (Stöttinger et al. 2018).
By directly comparing HCO groups, we found that the 
ability to recognize the second object is sensitive to age, 
with older seniors needing significantly longer than younger 
seniors to identify the second object in the gradual morphing 
condition. This is consistent with findings showing slower 
switch rates in ambiguous figures as people age (Ukai et al. 
2003). Since these groups were selected to match either the 
age or the cognitive status of the patient groups, it cannot be 
conclusively stated that age affects updating behavior. This 
effect could also reflect general cognitive decline. Indeed, 
six of our 18 HCO had a MoCA score below 26 with four 
of these participants in the HCO-cognitively matched group 
(> 70 years). According to the cutoff point initially pub-
lished, this would be suggestive of a mild cognitive impair-
ment (MCI; Nasreddine et al. 2005; Smith et al. 2007). How-
ever, more recent studies suggest cut-off scores of 22/23 to 
be more sensitive for MCI (Lee et al. 2008; Luis et al. 2009). 
All of our HCO were well within this range.
In summary, our study suggests that updating impair-
ments seen after damage to the right side of the brain most 
likely represent an impairment in the ability to explore the 
alternative interpretations within a slowly changing envi-
ronment. A better understanding of this type of cognitive 
impairment is relevant for developing an improved under-
standing of post-stroke behavioral deficits and prompting the 
study of specific rehabilitation procedures.
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